|
Teachers' Resource Web The Restoration and "Wit" Richard Kroll, UCI Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society (1667) In England, Sprat writes, [T]he study of wit and humor of writing prevails so much that there are but very few conditions or degrees or ages of men who are free from its infection. I will therefore declare to all those whom this spirit has possessed that there is in the works of nature an inexhaustible treasure of fancy and invention which will be revealed proportionately to the increase of their knowledge. To this purpose I must premise that it is required in the best and most delightful wit that it be founded on such strong images which are generally known, and are able to bring a strong and sensible impression on the mind. The several subjects from which it has been raised in all times are the fables and religions of the ancients, the civil histories of all countries, the customs of nations, the Bible, the sciences and manners of men, the several arts of their hands, and the works of nature. In all these, where there may be a resemblance of one thing to another, as there may be in all, there is a sufficient foundation for wit. (quoted from The Norton Anthology, Vol. I, 1706) In "The Author's Apology" to The State of Innocence, Dryden defines wit as follows: . . . . the definition of wit (which has so often been attempted, and ever successfully by many poets) is only this: That it is a propriety of thoughts and words; or, in other terms, thoughts and words elegantly adapted to the subject. (Scott-Saintsbury edition, vol. V.124) John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) from Book II, Chapter XI, "Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind": ANOTHER Faculty, we may take notice of in our Minds, is that of Discerning and distinguishing between the several Ideas it has . . . On this faculty of Distinguishing one thing from another, depends the evidence and certainty of several, even very general Propositions, which have passed for innate Truths; because Men over-looking the true cause, why those Propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform Impressions; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives two Ideas to be the same, or different . . . . . . . . If in having our Ideas in the Memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of Judgment, and clearness of Reason, which is to be observed in one Man above another . . . . For Wit lying most in the assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy: Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, Ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another . . . . (from the Oxford edition, ed. P.H. Nidditch. cf. also II.xi.par.2-5)
|